In the article “Reality and information: Is information a physical entity?” what we mean by information is analyzed. This is a very general review of the development of the theoretical and practical aspects that occurred throughout the twentieth century to the present day and which have led to the current vision of what information is.

The article “Reality and information: What is the nature of information?” goes deeper into this analysis. This is made from a more theoretical perspective based on the computation theory, information theory (IT) and algorithmic information theory (AIT).

But in this post, we will leave aside the mathematical formalism and expose some examples that will give us a more intuitive view of what information is and its relation to reality. And above all try to **expose what the axiomatic process of information means**. This should help to understand the concept of information beyond what is generally understood as a set of bits. And this is what I consider one of the obstacles to establishing a strong link between information and reality.

Nowadays, information and computer technology offers countless examples of how what we observe as reality can be represented by a set of bits. Thus, **videos, images, audio and written information can be encoded, compressed, stored and reproduced as a set of bits**. This is possible since they are all mathematical objects, which can be represented by numbers subject to axiomatic rules and can, therefore, be represented by a set of bits. However, the number of bits needed to encode the object depends on the coding procedure (axiomatic rules), so that the AIT determines its minimum value defined as the entropy of the object. However, the AIT does not provide any criteria for the implementation of the compression process, so in general they are based on practical criteria, for example statistical criteria, psychophysical, etc.

The **AIT establishes a formal definition of the complexity of mathematical objects**, called the **Kolmogorov complexity K(x)**. For a finite object

*x*,

*K(x)*is defined as the length of the shortest effective binary description of

*x*, and is an intrinsic property of the object and not a property of the evaluation process. Without entering into theoretical details, the AIT determines that only a small part of

*n*-bit mathematical objects can be compressed and encoded in

*m*bits

*n>m*, which means that most of them have a great complexity and can only be represented by themselves.

The **compression and decompression of video, images, audio, etc., are a clear example of axiomatic processing**. Imagine a video content *x* which, by means of a compression process *C*, has generated a content *C(x)* , so that by means of a decompression process *D* we can retrieve the original content *x=D(y) *. In this context, both *C* and *D* are axiomatic processes, understanding as axiom a proposition assumed within a theoretical body. This may seem shocking to the idea that an axiom is an obvious and accepted proposition without requiring demonstration. To clarify this point I will develop this idea in another post, for which I will use as an example the structure of natural languages.

In this context, the term axiomatic is totally justified theoretically, since the AIT does not establish any criteria for the implementation of the compression process. And, as already indicated, most mathematical objects are not compressible.

This example reveals an astonishing result of IT, defined as **“information without meaning”**. In such a way that **a bit string has no meaning unless a process is applied** that interprets the information and transforms it into knowledge. Thus, when we say that *x* is a video content we are assuming that it responds to a video coding system, according to the visual perception capabilities of humans.

And here we come to a transcendental conclusion regarding the nexus between information and reality. Historically, the development of IT has created the tendency to establish this nexus by considering the information as a sequence of bits exclusively. But AIT shows us that **we must understand information as a broader concept, made up of axiomatic processes and bit strings**. But for this, we must define it in a formal way.

Thus, both ** C and D are mathematical objects** that in

**practice are embodied in a set consisting of a processor and programs**that encode the functions of compression and decompression. If we define a processor as

*T()*and

*c*and

*d*the bit strings that encode the compression and decompression algorithms, we can express:

* y=T(**<c,x>)*

* x=T(<d,y>)*

where <*,*> is the concatenation of bit sequences.

Therefore, the axiomatic processing would be determined by the processor *T()*. And if we use any of the implementations of the universal Turing machine we will see that **the number of axiomatic rules is very small**. This may seem surprising if one considers that the above is extendable to the definition of any mathematical model of reality.

Thus, any mathematical model that describes **an element of reality can be formalized by means of a Turing machine**. The result of the model can be enumerable or Turing computable, in which case the *Halt* state will be reached, concluding the process. On the contrary, the problem can be undecidable or non-computable, so that the *Halt* state is never reached, continuing the execution of the process forever.

For example, let us weigh in the **Newtonian mechanics** determined by the laws of the dynamics and the attraction exerted by the masses. In this case, the system dynamics will be determined by the recursive process *w=T(<x,y,z>)*. Where *x* is the bit string encoding the laws of calculus, *y* the bit sequence encoding the laws of Newtonian mechanics and *z* the initial conditions of the masses constituting the system.

**It is frequent, as a consequence of the numerical calculus, to think that the processes are nothing more than numerical simulations of the models**. However, in the above example, both *x* and *y* can be the analytic expressions of the model and *w=T(<x,y,z>)* the analytical expression of the solution. Thus, if *z* specifies that the model is composed of only two massive bodies, *w=T(<x,y,z>)* will produce an analytical expression of the two ellipses corresponding to the ephemeris of both bodies. However, if *z* specifies more than two massive bodies, in general, the process will not be able to produce any result, not reaching the *Halt* state. This is because the Newtonian model has no analytical solution for three or more orbiting bodies, except for very particular cases, and is known as the three-body problem.

But we can make *x* and *y* encode the functions of numerical calculus, corresponding respectively to the mathematical calculus and to the computational functions of the Newtonian model. In this case, *w=T(<x,y,z>)* will produce recursively the numerical description of the ephemeris of the massive bodies. However, the process will not reach the *Halt* state, except in very particular cases in which the process may decide that the ephemeris is a closed trajectory.

**This behaviour shows that the Newtonian model is not computable or undecidable**. This is extendable to all models of nature established by physics since they are all non-linear models. If we consider the complexity of the *y* sequence corresponding to the Newtonian model, both in the analytical or in the numerical version, it is evident that the complexity *K(x)* is small. However, the complexity of *w=T(<x,y,z>)* is, in general, non-computable which justifies that it cannot be expressed analytically. If this were possible it would mean that *w* is an enumerable expression, which is in contradiction with the fact that it is a non-computable expression.

What is surprising is that from an enumerable expression <*x, y, z*> we can get a non-computable result. But this will be addressed another post.